11. Janus-Faced Grounding. Ergo. Forthcoming.

10. Aggregating Personal Value. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 19. Provisionally forthcoming.

9. Combining Good and Bad. In Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Perspectives on Ill-Being. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. (Invited)

8. Value After Death. Ratio 35(3): 194-203. 2022. [Published version]
Synopsis: I argue that we can have wellbeing after death. Revised my claim from “Permanent Value” to hold instead that we can have wellbeing after death without existing.

7. Structuring Wellbeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105(3):  564-580. 2022. [Published version]
Synopsis: I argue that we should distinguish between the grounds of wellbeing and the connections linking those grounds to wellbeing. I defend a view that makes different choices along these two axes of dependence when it comes to objectivism vs subjectivism, monism vs pluralism, and variabilism vs invariabilism.

6. Artifactual Normativity. Synthese 200(126): 1-19. 2022. [Published version]
Synopsis: I argue that normativity is a special sort of artifact, hence subjective yet real.

5. Joints and Basic Ways. Inquiry. Forthcoming. [Published version]
Synopsis: There are ungrounded properties that are not perfectly structural, and there are perfectly structural properties that are grounded.

4. Permanent Value. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8(2): 356-372. 2022. [Published version]
Synopsis: I formulate a version of temporal nihilism and reject it by arguing that people can exist and have wellbeing while they aren’t alive.

3. Epicureanism and Skepticism about Practical Reason. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(2): 195-208. 2020. [Published version]
Synopsis: Epicureanism about death leads to skepticism about practical reason.

2. Possible Intentions and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 8: 11-17. 2019. [Published version]
Synopsis: Appealing to possible intentions to intend benefit and not harm does not salvage the Doctrine of Double Effect.

1. Unbunking Arguments: A Case Study in Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. In Alvin Goldman & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press: 384-402. 2019. [Published version] (Invited)
Synopsis: An epistemically positive analogue of debunking arguments can give some epistemic justification to certain metaphysical judgments.


4. Review of Dale Dorsey’s A Theory of Prudence. The Journal of Moral Philosophy. Forthcoming.

3. Review of Guy Fletcher’s Dear Prudence. Utilitas 33(4): 505-509. 2021. [Published version]

2. Review of Andreas Müller’s Constructing Practical Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24(3): 859-861. 2021. [Published version]

1. Review of Jessica Wilson’s Metaphysical Emergence. Philosophy in Review 41(3): 221-223. 2021. [Published version]

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